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On the eve of the Nazi occupation joint-stock companies accounted for a significant 
part of the economic structure of the Bohemian Lands.1 Popularity of this specific 
legal form of business, allowing companies to accumulate capital resources on the 
widest scale and use them for projects usually beyond the capabilities of individuals, 
or the then prevailing legal forms of business (public company, limited partnership), 
while limiting the risk of its shareholders up to the amount of their capital stake, 
grew since the turn of the 19th and 20 th century. Share companies were increasing in 
importance in the context of the deepening concentration process and the growing 
interdependence of the economy. Between the wars, the economic crisis of the 1930s 
became another impulse that put increasing demands on the viability of economic 
operators, creating the prerequisites for their concentration and the transition to the 
form of a share company. By the end of the First Republic Era, joint-stock companies 
in the Bohemian Lands can be characterized as predominant, and in some economic 
sectors almost exclusive legal form of big business (industry, banking). Their impor-
tance in the context of the national economy as a whole appears to be crucial, both 
in terms of the capital accumulated in them, in terms of the number of concentrated 
labour forces, and their involvement in the international division of labour.
The joint-stock companies in the Bohemian Lands were significantly affected by 
the Nazi occupation. In the territory annexed to Germany, as well as in the territory 
of the later Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, they became the target of a sys-
tematic effort of the occupying power to control them and to exploit their potential 
in favour of Nazi Germany. The ultimate objective was their Germanization, i.e. the 
transfer of assets into German hands, in the case of joint-stock companies expressed 
as transfer of majority stakes or controlling blocks of shares. In order to achieve the 
stated objectives, the occupying power used a wide range of instruments, some of 
1 This study was produced as part of the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR) grant project 
no. P 410/ 14-03997P “Bankovní, obchodní a průmyslové velkopodnikání v Protektorátu 
Čechy a Morava. Institucionální a majetkoprávní změna” [Banking, industrial and com-
mercial large scale business in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Institutional and 




which applied across the business sector regardless of the legal status of the eco-
nomic operators concerned (trusteeship, commission agency, controlled economy 
authorities);2 others were derived from the special legal regulation of joint-stock 
companies under the trade law and were thus quite specific. 
It is from this vantage point that the following paper examines some selected as-
pects of the legal framework of business. It aims to analyse changes in the legal regu-
lation of joint-stock companies in the Bohemian Lands during the Nazi occupation 
and to evaluate their consequences from the perspective of their own functioning, 
and also in the wider context of the advancement of the occupier’s interests in the Bo-
hemian and Moravian economy. The paper describes analogies and discrepancies be-
tween Czechoslovak and German stock law at the time of the constitutional changes 
in the autumn of 1938. It focuses on the regulations modifying the stereotypes inher-
ent in the functioning of joint-stock companies and playing its role in the context of 
planned ownership changes. Included in the paper are regulations governing internal 
affairs in enterprises, i. e. administration and management of joint-stock companies 
(structure of the statutory bodies, competencies, and approval mechanisms), regu-
lations affecting external company representation and regulations governing stock 
trading.
The issues of the “legal framework of business” and the development of “joint-
stock companies”, which are the subject of this paper, have largely been treated sepa-
rately in the past research. Changes in the legislative framework of the business sec-
tor have been associated primarily with the construction of a controlled war economy 
in the academic literature (V. Průcha,3 J. Balcar — J. Kučera4). Another subject of an 
in-depth analysis was a body of regulations governing specific “Jewish question” 
(Aryanization, exclusion of Jews from economic life)5 and the Protectorate Labour 
2 As for general characteristics of the Aryanization and Germanization instruments of 
economic operators in he Bohemian Lands see Alice Teichová, Instruments of Economic 
Control and Exploitation: the German Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. In: R. J. Ove-
ry. — G. Otto — J. Houwink Ten Cate, Die Neuordnung Europas, NS- Wirtschaftspolitik 
in den besetzten Gebieten, Berlin 1997, pp. 83–108; Miloš Hořejš — Barbora Štolleová, 
“Arizace” a germanizace firem. In: Drahomír Jančík — Eduard Kubů (eds.), Nacionalismus 
zvaný hospodářský. Střety a zápasy o nacionální emancipaci/převahu v českých zemích 
(1859–1945), Prague 2011, pp. 519–533.
3 Václav Průcha et al., Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992, Vol. I. 
(1918–1945), Brno 2004, pp. 455–465; Václav Průcha, Základní rysy válečného řízeného 
hospodářství v českých zemích v letech nacistické okupace, Historie a vojenství 16, 1967, 
pp. 215–239.
4 Jaromír Balcar — Jaroslav Kučera, Von der Rüstkammer des Reiches zum Maschinenwerk 
des Sozialismus. Wirtschaftslenkung in Böhmen und Mähren 1938 bis 1953, München 
2013.
5 For example Drahomír Jančík — Eduard Kubů, “Arizace” a arizátoři. Drobný a střední 
židovský majetek v úvěrech Kreditanstalt der Deutschen (1939–45), Prague 2005; Dra-
homír Jančík — Eduard Kubů, Zrůdný monopol. “Hadega” a její obchod drahými kovy 
a drahokamy za druhé světové války. In: Terezínské studie a dokumenty 2001, Prague 




Law.6 Changes in the trade regulations have been dealt with cursorily in overview-
based works (L. Vojáček — K. Schelle — J. Tauchen,7 V. Urbanec8), without a desirable 
interpretation of their consequences in the wider context of the Nazi economic pol-
icy. As for the evolution of joint-stock companies, it is possible to draw on a number 
of case studies although the existing treatises, and this mainly applies to the period 
before November 1989, lack a more comprehensive analysis of a given entity in the 
spirit of the modern principles of business history, and they accentuate unilaterally 
selected issues, such as changes of production programmes, specific affairs involving 
the workers, and the like.9 The significant shift within the research brought the ex-
tensive book by Jaromír Balcar dedicated to the development of three key enterprises 
of the interwar Czechoslovakia during the war — the engineering group ČKD, Spolek 
pro chemickou a hutní výrobu [Association for Chemical and Metallurgical Produc-
tion] and Pražská železářská společnost [The Prague Ironworks]. Balcar works whith 
the concept of corporate governance and the new institutional economics and brings 
up, among others, a broad array of questions regarding the system of management 
and administration of industrial enterprises, regulation of relationships and respon-
sibilities between corporate governance and internal and external supervisory and 
control mechanisms.10 However, with regard to the chosen subject, those who have 
advanced the furthest are indisputably the team of economic historians D. Jančík — 
E. Kubů — J. Šouša — J. Novotný, exploring after the turn of the millennium the role 
of German joint-stock banks in the process of Aryanization and Germanization of the 
business sector in Bohemia and Moravia.11 The team subsequently also addressed the 
topic of securities as a conceivable Aryanization and Germanization instrument.12 
(1939–1941), Prague 2000; Jaromír Tauchen, Princip zvláštnho zákonodárství jako jeden 
z principů fungování státního aparátu nacistického Německa. In: Právní a ekonomické 
problémy VI., Brno 2008, pp. 108–114 and other. 
6 Jaromír Tauchen, Práce a její právní regulace v Protektorátu Čechy a Morava (1939–1945), 
Prague 2016.
7 Ladislav Vojáček — Karel Schelle — Jaromír Tauchen et al., Vývoj soukromého práva na 
území českých zemí, Bd. II, Brno 2012, pp. 704–719. 
8 Vítězslav Urbanec, Příspěvek k dějinám akciových společností v českých zemích, Prague 
2005, pp. 31–35, 48.
9 Cf. František Janeček, Největší zbrojovka monarchie. Škodovka v dějinách, Prague 1990; 
Vladimír Karlický et al., Svět okřídleného šípu. Koncern Škoda Plzeň 1918–1945, Plzeň 
1999; Jiří Matějček — Josef Vytiska, Vítkovice — železárny a strojírny Klementa Gottwal-
da, Prague 1978 etc. 
10 Jaromír Balcar, Panzer für Hitler — Traktoren für Stalin. Groβunternehmen in Böhmen 
und Mähren 1938–1950, München 2014.
11 Drahomír Jančík — Eduard Kubů — Jiří Šouša. Unter Mitarbeit von J. Novotný, Arisier-
ungsgewinnler. Die Rolle der deutschen Banken bei der “Arisierung” und Konfiskation jü-
discher Vermögen im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren (1939–1945), Studien zur Sozial- 
und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Ostmiteleuropas 21, Wiesbaden 2011.
12 Drahomír Jančík, Metody germanizace českého hospodářského prostoru v období německé 
okupace na příkladu Báňské a  hutní společnost, Acta oeconomica Pragensia: vědecký 




LEGAL REGULATION OF JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES  
IN THE BOHEMIAN LANDS ON THE TRESHOLD 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
The legal regulation of joint-stock companies in the Bohemian Lands consisted, in 
principle, in the era of the First Republic, of regulations incorporated into the Czecho-
slovak legislation from the pre-war era, notably the General Commercial Code (1863) 
and the Stock Regulation (1899). The regulations included the formation of joint-stock 
companies (subscription of share capital, granting a concession by the government), 
their administration (definition of the rights and obligations of the statutory bodies, 
i.e. the board of directors/management board, general meeting, and accountant co-
missioners /supervisory board), economic organization (balance sheet, profit, reserve 
funds), formal requirements for shares, dissolution and transformation of joint-stock 
companies.13 Although the system was already regarded as outdated in the period dis-
course and did not correspond to the deep transformation of the business environ-
ment and the importance of the joint-stock business within the economy, it was not 
in principle modified. More significant interventions in the interwar period only re-
sulted in specific adjustments concerning the joint-stock banks adopted in 1924.14 
The period criticism, mediated for the Czechoslovak public by Cyril Horáček, Karel 
Kizlink and Jiří Hejda, inter alia,15 was levelled at the management of joint-stock com-
manizace a “odžidovštění” Západočeského báňského akciového spolku (Westböhmischer 
Bergbau-Aktien-Verein), Acta oeconomica Pragensia: vědecký sborník Vysoké školy eko-
nomické v Praze 16, 2008, no. 3, pp. 110–119; Jiří Novotný — Jiří Šouša, Instrument ger-
manizace velkého podnikání v protektorátu Čechy a Morava?: k vývoji Pražské burzy 
pro zboží a cenné papíry a jejímu fungování při obchodování akciemi v letech 1939–1945, 
Acta oeconomica Pragensia: vědecký sborník Vysoké školy ekonomické v Praze 16, 2008, 
no. 1, pp. 74–87; the outcome of the grant project of Ministry of foreign affair ČR (proj-
ect nr. RB/19/02) „Arizace a germanizace cenných papírů jako instrument k potlačení 
židovského a českého elementu ve velkopodnikatelském hospodářství protektorátu Čechy 
a Morava a Říšské župy Sudety“.
13 The structure of the joint-stock company was specifically studied by Jaroslav Pošvář, chief 
ministerial inspector at the ministry of the Interior. In June 1933 he published a practical 
handbook summing up and commenting on the regulations and the basic judicature in 
view of their practical application. Jaroslav Pošvář, Akciová společnost podle norem plat-
ných v historických zemích, Prague 1933. See also František Rouček, Československé prá-
vo obchodní I., Prague 1938, pp. 45–46; Arnošt Wenig, Příručka obchodního práva plat-
ného v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku, Brno 1922–1924. In the historical retrospective 
L. Vojáček– K. Schelle — J. Tauchen a kol., Vývoj soukromého práva, pp. 689–703; Karel 
Eliáš, Akciová společnost. Systematický výklad obecného akciového práva se zřetelem 
k jeho reformě, Prague 2000, pp. 77–80.
14 L. Vojáček — K. Schelle — J. Tauchen et al., Vývoj soukromého práva, pp. 693–694; Jiří No-
votný — Jiří Šouša, Změny v bankovním systému v letech 1923–1938. In: František Ven-
covský et al., Dějiny bankovnictví v českých zemích, Prague 1999, pp. 240–241. 
15 Cyril Horáček, O  zákonné úpravě podnikání akciového, Prague 1928; Jiří Hejda, 




panies and the related decision-making mechanisms. Under the existing legislation, 
the dominant role of the general meeting was preserved as the highest corporate body 
representing the “shareholders’ will” and deciding on all important company acts. 
These included, among others, the approval of the annual statement of accounts, the 
resolution on the distribution of net profits, the approval of the board of directors, 
the approval of amendments to the articles of association (including the conditions for 
an increase or decrease in the share capital), the resolution on the dissolution of the 
company. The general meeting was usually convened by the board of directors whose 
function was executive and representative and stemmed directly from the mandate 
given by the general meeting.16 The shareholders had a right to add items proposed by 
them on to general meeting agenda, as well as to initiate (in writing, with a statement 
of purpose and reason) the holding of an extraordinary general meeting.17 The general 
meeting decided on the election and appointment of the board of directors and deter-
mined its remuneration, and was entitled to revoke its mandate at any time. The ability 
of the general meeting to pass resolutions was conditional, depending on the nature of 
the resolution, on the representation of a certain amount of share capital at the general 
meeting, the principle being that each share constituted a voting right. The strong posi-
tion of the shareholders in the legal structure of the joint-stock company was reflected 
in the provisions concerning the annual statement of accounts for the shareholders 
to have access to the annual report with the balance sheet and the profit and loss ac-
count; the entire approval process could be almost indefinitely prolonged (requesting 
an explanation etc.). The control mechanisms in the existing legislation, both internal 
and external, were described as insuficcient. Criticism was directed at the accountant 
comissioners (predecessor of the supervisory board), who carried out rather formal 
checks only (their fee was usually based on a percentage of the net profit).18 The role of 
the so called government inspectors was considered very passive and the room they had 
for manoeuvre defined by law was very limited. The licensing system, i.e. the official ap-
proval of the establishment of new companies, and the official approval of all changes 
in the articles of association by the ministry of the interior, in public, gave the impres-
sion of the credibility of the company, but in fact it was only a formal matter (ensuring 
conformity between the articles of association and the letter of the law).19 
v České národohospodářské společnosti v Praze ve dnech 18. listopadu 1929 a 20. ledna 
1930, Prague 1930; Karel Kizlink, Vývojová tendence práva akciových společností v době 
nejnovější, Vědecká ročenka právnické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity v Brně, V/1926, 
pp. 189–235 and VI/1927, pp. 210–252.
16 Hejda has defined succinctly the relationship between a shareholder and the company 
management as one between a mandator and a mandatary. J. Hejda, Hospodářská funkce 
akciové společnosti, p. 55.
17 To table a motion to call an extraordinary general meeting and to add an item on the agen-
da it was necessary to hold 1/10 of the share capital. See J. Pošvář, Akciová společnost, 
pp. 89–93. 
18 C. Horáček, O zákonné úpravě podnikání akciového, pp. 8.





The original legal regulation of joint-stock companies, placing the shareholders’ 
interest at the centre, was based on the assumption that the interests of the sharehold-
ers are identical with those of the joint-stock company as such. As Jiří Hejda argues 
plausibly, by the turn of the 1930s, in the increasingly dense “organic tangle of capi-
talism”, this equation had become somewhat imbalanced. The interest of an acciden-
tal shareholder desirous of the highest possible dividend, the interest of a speculator 
closely watching the development of the stock exchange for the best possible sale, or 
the interest of competing shareholder seeking only to gain a competitive advantage, 
could be diametrically opposed and often differed from the interest of his own com-
pany, ensuring the stability of the company’s development and its long-term sustain-
ability.20 Diversification of interests in the shareholders’ ranks also greatly facilitated 
the spread of the so-called indirect shareholding where the shares in a company were 
owned not by individuals but by corporations whose interests were subsequently de-
rived from links to other corporations, especially banks and concerns. Doubts about 
the setting up of decision-making mechanisms in a joint-stock company also raised 
the question of the professional competence of shareholders, in whose hands, accord-
ing to the relevant legal regulations, lay all its “fate”, but in practice, they often took 
only an occasional interest in the company’s operations or evinced no interest at all.21 
As a result of the situation in which the legal regulation of joint stock compa-
nies obviously did not correspond to the modern trends in the development of the 
economy, there was a demand for a comprehensive reform of the stock law. Across the 
legal and national economy circles, both at home and abroad, questions were asked 
about the function of the shares, the new definition of the rights and duties of the 
company’s bodies, the protection of the small shareholders, and the publicity. At the 
level of the structure of the company bodies, efforts were made to balance the relative 
ratio of forces between the shareholders and the bodies to uphold not only the inter-
ests of the shareholders in respect of the joint-stock company and its bodies, but also 
the interests of the company as a whole against the particular interests of the share-
holders. The position of the executive authorities should be sufficiently “strong”, it 
should be left with the necessary initiative and the freedom of independent decision-
making in the management of the company, even to defend the company’s interests 
against the shareholders themselves. In essence, these requirements responded to 
the ongoing structural changes in joint-stock companies, where, as a result of their 
“depersonalization”, the role of the board of directors as a body delegated by the gen-
eral meeting (here is the symptomatic influence of banking management)22 and the 
company’s professional management (directorship). Although in many other coun-
tries the similar tendencies between the wars materialized in the form of new laws, 
20 J. Hejda, Hospodářská funkce akciové společnosti, pp. 39–47. 
21 Ibidem, pp. 41–42. Cf. K. Kizlink, Vývojová tendence, V/1926, p. 226.
22 Hejda considered the intermingling of bank capital and concern participation as the prin-
cipal factors in the “new” development of the management board within a joint-stock 
company. The banks’ influence consisted in share holding and could be multiplied in con-
sequence of company financing (bank as a creditor). See J. Hejda, Hospodářská funkce 




which in the legal construction specified a wide range of unresolved or insufficiently 
solved aspects, they were not legally anchored in inter-war Czechoslovakia. Czecho-
slovakia thus entered from the point of view of the legal regulation of the joint-stock 
companies into the occupation phase with rather outdated system.
ANNEXED BORDERLANDS: MANDATORY TRANSFER  
OF JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES INTO THE GERMAN SHARE LAW REGIME
The importance of the attempts to reform the stock law in the era of the First Repub-
lic gains a new dimension in the context of the occupation of the Bohemian Lands 
in the autumn of 1938. The joint-stock companies located in the territory annexed to 
Nazi Germany gradually passed, fully in line with the process of integrating these 
areas into the legal system of the German Reich, into the German stock law regime. 
A decree of 3 December 1938 (RgBl. 209) extended the validity of the provisions of the 
German Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz] from 1937 to Sudeten German joint-
stock companies and limited partnerships on shares newly entered in the Commer-
cial Register, to companies whose headquarters were newly transferred to/from Su-
detenland, and to companies which entered into a merger with another joint stock 
company which was already subject to the German law.23 Two months later, an ordi-
nance of 9 February 1939, extended the validity of the German Stock Corporation Act 
broadly to all Sudeten German joint-stock companies. An integral part of the trans-
formation of the Sudeten German companies was a transition to the Reich opening 
balance sheet [RM-Eröffnungsbilanz].24 
German stock law, which was fully re-codified in January 193725 exhibited many 
differences in comparison with the First Republic stock law. Under the German law, 
the form of a joint-stock company was reserved only for large enterprises with a min-
23 Erste Verordnung zur Einführung handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften in den Sudetend-
eutschen Gebietten vom 3. Dezember 1938. In: Aktiengesetz mit Amtlicher Begründung, 
Einführungsgesetz, Durchführungverordnungen und Einführungsverordnungen für das 
Land Österreich und sudetendeutschen Gebiete, Berlin 1939, p. 295. 
24 As it was earlier in Austria, the companies in Sudetenland had to declare the opening bal-
ance sheet in Reich marks (RM). The switch to RM-Eröffnungsbilanz was to take place 
as of 1 November 1938 at the earliest and as of 1 January 1940 at the latest. Until the of-
ficial declaration of the new balance the share capital of German joint-stock companies 
was converted at the official rate 1 K = 0.12 RM. According to data in Compass, by the end 
of 1940 there were in Sudetenland 164 joint-stock companies — 86 had switched to RM-
Eröffnungsbilanz (share capital RM 384 million), and 78 companies had not switched to 
RM (483 million crowns). By the end of 1941 the process accelerated. Of the total num-
ber of 150 joint-stock companies 113 published RM-Eröffnungsbilanz (RM 510.7 million), 
as against 37 companies whose capital was still reported in crowns (215 million crowns). 
Compass. Finanzielles Jahrbuch. Österreich — Sudetenland, Wien 1942, p. 1199; Compass. 
Finanzielles Jahrbuch. Österreich — Sudetenland, Wien 1943, p. 1199.
25 Concerning the recodification see Aktien Recht im Wandel, Walter Bayer — Mathias Hab-




imum share capital of newly created companies being set at RM 500 000 (for exist-
ing companies it was set as the minimum existing capital; for companies with share 
capital below RM 100 000 the obligation was to transform or dissolve the company 
by the bridging date, 31.12.1940)26. At the same time, the minimum nominal value of 
the share was set at RM 1 000, which was clearly targeted against small sharehold-
ers and fragmented holdings in general. In accordance with the Nazi ideology, the 
state’s strong influence was enshrined in the general diction of the German law in 
the spirit of upholding the interests of the nation and the Reich. In the establishment 
of companies, the so-called normative system continued to exist (i.e., the statutory 
requirements did not require special approval by the state administration), but the 
state acted as a protector of public interest throughout the life of the company, and if 
the company damaged its public welfare [Gemeinwohl], the state authorities, specifi-
cally the Ministry of economy [Reichswirtschaftsministerium], had the power even 
to dissolve the joint-stock company.27 Practically in all important provisions, the State 
and its authorities had the power to deviate from the regulations.
In comparison between the two legal systems (Czechoslovak and German), there 
were fundamental differences in the structure of the bodies of the joint-stock com-
pany, especially concerning the rights and responsibilities of the general meeting 
[valná hromada under the Czechoslovak law, Hauptversammlung under the German 
law], board of directors/management board [představenstvo/správní rada under 
the Czechoslovak law], and board of directors/supervisory board [Vorstand/Aufsi-
chtsrat under the German law].28 Referring to the efforts to reduce “management’s 
dependence on the mass of irresponsible shareholders”29 and to solve the power 
 práva akciových společností, Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University, Brno 
2011, pp. 11–21.
26 Einführungsgesetz zum Gesez über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften 
auf Aktien vom 30. Jannuar 1937. In: Aktiengesetz mit Amtlicher Begründung, Einfüh-
rungsgesetz, Durchführungverordnungen und Einführungsverordnungen für das Land 
Österreich und sudetendeutschen Gebiete, Berlin 1939, pp. 143–153. 
27 Gesetz über Aktiengesellschften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktiengesetz) 
vom 30. Jannuar 1937. In: Aktiengesetz mit Amtlicher Begründung, Einführungsgesetz, 
Durchführungverordnungen und Einführungsverordnungen für das Land Österreich und 
sudetendeutschen Gebiete, Berlin 1939, pp. 137–138. 
28 While under the Czechoslovak law the board of directors [představenstvo] and manage-
ment board [správní rada] were usually identical, under the German law there were two 
separate bodies: the board of directors [Vorstand] and the supervisory board [Aufsich-
tsrat]. Despite some differencies, the German supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat] as the body 
elected by the general meeting was analogous to the management board [správní rada] 
under the Czechoslovak/Protectorate commercial law. There was no resemblance between 
the supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat] under the German law and the supervisory board 
[dozorčí rada] under the Czechoslovak law. 
29 Amtliche Begründung zum Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesell-
schaften auf Aktien vom 30. Jannuar 1937. In: Aktiengesetz mit Amtlicher Begründung, 
Einführungsgesetz, Durchführungverordnungen und Einführungsverordnungen für das 




struggles that threatened society and the general economic life, the general meeting 
[Hauptversammlung], i.e. the original bearer of all the fundamental decisions of the 
company, was weakened in German law and its own management strengthened. The 
general meeting [Hauptversammlung] in the German corporation law was limited to 
approving changes in the articles of association, revoking, merging or rebuilding the 
company, appointing and dismissing the supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat], appoint-
ing and dismissing the special inspectors [Abschlussprüfer, Sonderprüfer], and de-
cisions on profit sharing.30 Shareholders were given general information as regards 
the development of the company, but the level of shared information has been left to 
the board of discretion. As regards company management, the general meeting could 
only intervene in cases explicitly required by the board of directors and its opinions 
were entirely non-binding on the board of directors. Wider powers could not be del-
egated to the general meeting through the articles of association.
The management of the company (both in the sense of “Leitung” and “Geschafts-
führung”, including the approval of the annual statement of accounts), as well as its 
representation, was entrusted to the board of directors [Vorstand]. Under the Ger-
man Stock Corporation Act from 1937 the board of directors was designated as the 
central body of the company, and its tasks in the performance of its functions were 
to reconcile the interests of the company and its “Gefolgschaft” with the interests 
and needs of the people and the Reich.31 The potential significance of this provision 
was captured by Zdeněk Keprta in the “České právo” when he asked and answered 
a question about the German board of directors [Vorstand]: “How will the board up-
hold these interests (i.e. interests of the company and state) if they collide? Probably 
in favour of the state.”32 The chairman of the board, whose opinion was considered 
decisive in any deliberate decision-making, was endowed with special powers if the 
board had been elected as a multi-member board. In addition, the law was interpreted 
in the sense that its authority will not be the chairman of the board of directors to 
apply only in the case of equality of votes, but “in all cases where there is an opinion 
different from his”. As a non-democratic principle was also regarded the fact that 
the chairman of a German joint-stock company was not elected as a member of the 
board of directors [Vorstand], but appointed by the supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat] 
as “the most reliable person”.33 In the period interpretation the chairman of the board 
of directors “embodied all power in society”, perceived in analogy with the Führer 
[Leader]. 
30 “It need not be stressed that is a very welcome fig leaf for the board of directors enabling it 
to do whatever it wants without the shareholders’ knowledge.” Zdeněk Keprta, Demokra - 
tický princip ve vnitřním zařízení akciových společností (Dokončení), České právo. 
Časopis Spolku notářů česko-slovenských, XX., 1938, č. 8, p. 89.
31 Gesetz über Aktiengesellschften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktiengesetz) 
vom 30. Jannuar 1937. In: Aktiengesetz mit Amtlicher Begründung, Einführungsgesetz, 
Durchführungverordnungen und Einführungsverordnungen für das Land Österreich und 
sudetendeutschen Gebiete, Berlin 1939, pp. 137–138.





The board of directors [Vorstand] of a German joint-stock company was elected 
for a maximum of five years by the supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat], but in the ex-
ercise of its activity it remained largely independent of this board. By law, the su-
pervisory board [Aufsichtsrat] could not deal with matters reserved to the board of 
directors [Vorstand], in relation to the board of directors it could not be made the 
superior body, and, last but not least, the board of directors’ independence was se-
cured by a provision allowing the supervisory board to recall members of the board 
of directors only in serious cases. The supervisory board was responsible for over-
seeing the company’s business management (in particular, reviewing the annual 
statement of accounts, propose profit distribution and annual report), and inform-
ing the general meeting in this regard. The number of members of the supervisory 
board [Aufsichtsrat] was limited by law: the German Stock Corporation Act from 1937 
principally provided for a three-member board, the highest number of members was 
subsequently determined by the share capital, i.e. for companies with a share capital 
of up to 3 million RM the supervisory board was limited to 7 persons, with a share 
capital of up to 20 million RM to 12 persons, and with a share capital of more than 20 
million RM to 20 persons. The law also stipulated that a member of the supervisory 
board may not be a person who performs such a function in 10 or more other public 
joint-stock companies or limited partnerships, and it granted the Reich minister of 
justice the right to make dispensations to that effect.34 
The application of the German stock law in Sudetenland resulted in a comprehen-
sive restructuring of the local companies. Setting the minimum value of the share 
capital and the share nominal value supported the concentration process.35 A symp-
tomatic phenomenon was the creation of new “Sudeten German” companies. These 
consisted of until then independent business entities or branches, which, due to the 
constitutional changes in 1938 found themselves “behind the borders” or didn’t fit 
the German stock regulations. A typical example is the Sudetenländische Bergbau-
Aktiengesellschaft [Sudeten German Mining Joint-stock Company] headquartered 
in Most and established at the beginning of 1939, which controlled mines and metal-
lurgical plants originally in the hands of the Czechoslovak state and other Czecho-
slovak companies.36 Similarly, the Sudetenländische Zucker-Gesellschaft [Sudeten 
34 In contrast to the ongoing Czechoslovak trade law, the German Stock Corporation Act from 
1937 used the term „Konzern“ [a concern] and „Konzernunternehmen“ [a company be-
longing to a group]. Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf 
Aktien (Aktiengesetz) vom 30. Jannuar 1937, p. 4; Ibidem, Amtliche Begründung zum Ge-
setz über Aktiengesellschaften, pp. 160–161. 
35 The contrast between the minimal nominal share value in Czechoslovakia and in Germa-
ny was significant. Pošvář specified in the joint-stock company handbook in 1933 a mini-
mum 200 crowns per share (in exceptional cases 100 crowns per share), while under the 
German stock law it was RM 1000 per share. J. Pošvář, Akciová společnost, p. 42; cf. Ge-
setz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktiengesetz) 
vom 30. Jannuar 1937, p. 2.
36 A company with a share capital of RM 80 000 000 divided into 80 000 shares (1000 RM 
each) belonged to the concern Reichswerke Hermann Göring. See Compass. Finanzielles 




German Sugar Company], which was legally linked to a sugar factory in Most of 1925, 
increased in importance disproportionally as a result of purchases of refineries and 
sugar factories from Czechoslovak companies.37 
A number of Sudeten German joint-stock companies show that the reorganiza-
tion of statutory bodies under German stock law was far from being a formal change. 
The determination of the maximum number of members of the supervisory board 
as well as of the board of directors’ concept, in some cases consisting of one per-
son, led in practice to considerable leverage of senior management. Restructuring 
the bodies of joint-stock companies and their hierarchical construction correlated 
with the application of the “Führerprinzip” [Leader principle], which was a charac-
teristic building block of Nazi law in general.38 Alongside the principle outlined at 
all levels of corporate governance, corporate culture, that is, the patterns of conduct 
and practices that have so far existed in the corporate society, changed sharply. Sug-
gested changes in the functioning of joint-stock companies fit into the wider context 
of business environment changes that have characterized the growth rate of govern-
ment intervention. If the system of controlled economy, through a wide variety of 
organs, restrained, or completely negated, the autonomy of the entrepreneur’s will 
(regulation of production, distribution/trade and consumption), the reception of the 
German stock law ensured an adequate change within the companies (state control, 
Führerprinzip).
PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA: JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES  
AT A CROSSROADS BETWEEN TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS 
While joint-stock companies located in the territory annexed in the autumn of 1938 
to the German Reich followed compulsorily the regime of German stock law, the situ-
ation was different in the second Czechoslovak Republic and later in the Protectorate 
of Bohemia and Moravia. Given the autonomous status of the Protectorate the princi-
ple of legal continuity was to be maintained, which meant at the level of the commer-
cial law the factual maintenance of the regime of the General Commercial Code, plus 
a stock regulation from the end of the 19th century. A profound transformation of the 
business environment was largely caused by a rigorous redefinition of the economic 
relationships and functions in consequence of the introduction of a controlled econ-
omy system39 without corresponding changes in the legal structure of trading com-
37 A company with a share capital of RM 3 400 000 divided into 3 400 shares (1000 RM each), 
Compass. Finanzielles Jahrbuch. Österreich — Sudetenland, Wien 1942, pp. 1387–1388.
38 Viktor Knapp, Problém nacistické právní filosofie, Prague 1947, pp. 121–125.
39 A general prerequisite for ensuring the German influence in the protectorate economy 
was the subordination of autonomous administration to the newly established German 
authorities. Concerning the development of Reichsprotector’s office see Barbora Štolleová, 
Between Autonomy and the Reich Administration. Economic Department of the Reich 
Protector’s Office (1939–1942), Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen = 




panies, including joint-stock companies. To exert German authority in enterprises, 
both on the personnel and the capital level, primarily the existing guidelines were to 
be respected, some to be complemented with mechanisms enabling their temporary 
rescission (without changes in the legal structure as such). 
Principal instruments allowing for flouting of the existing system of commercial 
law which were very much used in joint-stock companies included the institution of 
“trusteeship”. Appointments of trustees for abandoned enterprises, or in cases where 
the public interest so demanded, originally made under Protectorate Government 
Ordinance No. 87 of 21 March 1939, came within the competence of the Protector-
ate authorities,40 but the German occupation authorities soon took steps to limit the 
Protectorate authorities’ powers.41 Of key importance was the Reich Protector’s Or-
dinance of 21 June 1939 on Jewish property,42 which enabled him to appoint for Jewish 
enterprises so called “treuhänders”, and to dismiss trustees and receivers appointed 
under the Protectorate regulations. The treuhänders acted in conformity with the 
rights and obligations laid down by the Reich Protector and reported directly to him 
on their activities.43 The actual definition of a Jewish company was very flexible, so 
that the Ordinance could be applied to a wide gamut of economic operators. In the 
case of a joint-stock company the decisive factor could be for example the presence 
of a single “Jew” on the management or supervisory board or holding one quarter 
of the capital.44 In some cases the appointments were not made by the Reich Protec-
40 Administration of abandoned companies through interim trustees (appointed by the dis-
trict or land council) was the subject of the Government Ordinance of 14 October 1938. 
Helena Petrův, Právní postavení židů v Protektorátu Čechy a Morava (1939–1941), Prague 
2000, pp. 49–50, 55; cf. Vládní nařízení č. 87 ze dne 21. 3. 1939 o správě hospodářských 
podniků a o dozoru nad nimi, Sbírka zákonů a nařízení [hereinafter as Sb. z. a n.] Protek-
torátu Čechy a Morava 1939, pp. 461–462; Vládní nařízení č. 234 ze dne 14. 10. 1938 o zatím-
ní správě opuštěných hospodářských podniků a závodů, Sb. z. a n. státu československého 
1938, pp. 1059.
41 These aims were pursued with measures taken by heads of civil administration in Bohe-
mia and Moravia. The practical effect was limited and the measures did not immediately 
result in systematic removal of original trustees. Eduard Kubů, Die Verwaltung von kon-
fisziertem und sequestriertem Vermögen — eine spezifische Kategorie des „Arisierungs-
Profits“: Die Kreditanstalt der Deutschen und Ihre Abteilung „F“. In: Dietrich Ziegler (Hg.), 
Geld und Kapital. Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft für mitteleuropäische Banken- und Sparkas-
sengeschichte 2001, Banken und „Arisierungen“ in Mitteleuropa während des National-
sozialismus, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 178–179.
42 Nařízení Říšského protektora v  Čechách a  na Moravě o  židovském majetku ze dne 
21. června 1939, Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren 1939, 
pp. 45–48.
43 The Reich Protector’s Office classified several types of treuhänders according to purpose. 
For more details of the overall typology and the receivers’ and treuhänders’ rights and ob-
ligations see E. Kubů, Die Verwaltung, pp. 177–185.
44 In the case of a legal entity, one or more persons called to represent themselves by law 
or one or more members of the statutory bodies (the administrative and supervisory 




tor (or by the Oberlandrat as the lower lewel of German administration within the 
protectorate), but by the Secret State Police (Gestapo), NSDAP, or a Reich commissar 
for handling enemy property,45 which resulted in confused situations as well as fre-
quent demarcation disputes. Whatever the trustee’s official title or position was, from 
the perspective of running a company the consequences of “trusteeship” were simi-
lar. They involved immediate suspension of the rights of company owners, partners 
or statutory bodies and their transfer to a receiver. As a result, standard resolution 
mechanisms in joint-stock companies were suppressed (general meeting, manage-
ment board) and replaced with the trustee’s authority.46
Manoeuvring within the bounds of the economic regulations logically brought to 
the foreground the handling of capital shares as the primary instrument for control-
ling joint-stock companies. The Protectorate legal regulation, in which the relatively 
strong influence of the shareholders on the company management was conserved, 
evidently created auspicious conditions for the start of the Germanization process 
through changes in the shareholding. If we consider the differences between the 
Protectorate and the German stock law, it is conceivable that from the perspective 
of Germanization the preservation of the original Czechoslovak law was more ad-
vantageous for the occupation power than immediate transition to the regime of the 
German stock law. Transition to the German Reich regime only appeared desirable 
the moment when the “German” influence in the company management was factu-
ally assured (transition to the German stock regime strengthened the positions of the 
existing management and fostered its independence of the shareholders). This might 
be also understood as one of the causes of the different approach towards joint-stock 
companies in the annexed borderlands where the occupation power presumed that 
most of the enterprises were already in “German” hands and that in the Protectorate 
where German capital interests were overall lower. 
Trading in shares in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia was subject to a num-
ber of regulations. The measures primarily aimed to compile detailed shareholding 
records so that selected capital stakes could be transferred to the state or to particular 
interest groups. The duty to report shareholdings was first imposed in response to 
the constitutional changes in October 1938. The Czechoslovak National Bank or more 
ing rights (judged as of 17 March 1939). A decisive share in the capital meant that more 
than one quarter of the capital belonged to Jews. A decisive participation in the voting 
rights meant that the votes of the Jews amounted to one half of the total number of votes. 
A branch of a Jewish enterprise was always considered to be a Jewish enterprise, a branch 
of a non-Jewish enterprise was considered a Jewish enterprise if its director or one of sev-
eral managers were Jews. In the definition of a Jewish enterprise there was a completely 
free interpretation, stating that an enterprise is considered Jewish if it is “in fact under the 
controlling influence of Jews.” The interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Neurath regulation 
was, with minor changes, quoted in the commentary by H. Petrův, quoted above, pp. 62–63
45 Nařízení o nakládání s nepřátelským majetkem ze dne 15. 1. 1940, Verordnungsblatt des 
Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren 1940, pp. 28–36.
46 J. Procházka, Procesní a materiální účinky komisařského vedení, České právo. Časopis 




precisely, a special commission set up by the bank, was granted considerable powers 
to decide about future deals in capital stakes.47 A special measure of the National Bank 
reserved the right to later purchase offered securities.48 Checks on shareholdings 
were tightened after the establishment of the Protectorate, this time fully in the con-
text of the occupation authorities’ efforts seeking Aryanization and Germanization 
of the economic operators. Initially, reporting duty was imposed for capital stakes 
in Jewish hands (ordinances on Jewish assets, including a series of implementing 
provisions);49 capital stakes in companies located abroad were identified under spe-
cial regulations.50 Efforts were made to identify linkages within concern structures 
according to a decree issued by the prime minister on 15 May 1941, when it was an-
nounced that special sample surveys were being conducted on existing and newly 
created concerns and capital stakes in enterprises.51 
In a sense the trends culminated in the passing of the Government Ordinance 
of 9 May 1942 (revised in part by decrees of the ministry of economy and labour of 
June 1942 and July 1943), under which all individuals and legal entities headquar-
tered in the Protectorate were duty bound to report holdings of shares and “colo-
nial holdings” quoted on any stock exchange within the Third Reich.52 In principle, 
47 The Ordinance made it compulsory to report shareholdings, primary share investments 
and other capital holdings with registered capital in excess of 5 million crowns if  the 
stake exceeded 5% of the registered capital and/or the sum of one million crowns. Vlád-
ní nařízení č.  232 ze dne 14.  10.  1938, kterým se obmezuje nakládání s  kapitálovými 
účastmi, Sb. z. a n. státu československého 1938, pp. 1057; Opatření stálého výboru č. 239 
ze dne 18. 10. 1938, kterým se obmezuje nakládání s kapitálovými účastmi, Sb. z a n. stá-
tu československého 1938, pp. 1062–1063. Vládní nařízení č. 196 ze dne 8. 5. 1940, jímž se 
zrušuje opatření Stálého výboru z dne 18. října 1938, č. 239 Sb., kterým se obmezuje nak-
ládání s kapitálovými účastmi, s předpisy je provádějícími, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy 
a Morava 1940, p. 486.
48 Opatření Národní banky Československé o výhradě práva pozdějšího převzetí nabíd-
nutých cenných papírů, Sb. z. a n. státu československého 1938, p. 1228.
49 Especially Čtvrtý prováděcí výnos k nařízení Reichsprotektora in Böhmen und Mähren 
o židovském majetku ze dne 7. 2. 1940, Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen 
und Mähren 1940, pp. 45–47.
50 Vyhláška ministra financí (82) ze dne 13. 1. 1942, kterou se uveřejňuje opatření Národní 
banky pro Čechy a Moravu v Praze o hlášení účastí v cizině, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy 
a Morava 1942, pp. 88–90.
51 Vyhláška předsedy vlády ze dne 15. 5. 1941 o statisice koncernové a kapitálových a záj-
mových účastí na podnicích, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1941, p. 996. Further 
background to the surveys see V. Vilinskij, Koncernové šetření Ústředníího statistického 
úřadu, Statistische Rundschau.Statistický obzor 1943, XXIV, no. 3–4, pp. 59–84. 
52 Reports were made back to 1 January 1939. Vládní nařízení ze dne 9. 5. 1942 o hlášení 
některých cenných papírů, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1942, pp. 858–860. 
Within the Heydrich’s reform of the public administration the agenda of joint-stock com-
panies (originally handled by ministry of interior) was transferred under the ministry 
of economy. Změna v úřední příslušnosti ve věcech akciových společností, Právní prakse 





the Ordinance applied to the exchange value of securities in excess of  one mil-
lion crowns, but the protectorate minister of economy and labour was authorized 
to demand reports below this threshold, demand reports on unquoted securities 
and grant dispensations. What is material in the context of examining the concern 
structures is that the regulation authorized the minister of economy and labour, by 
agreement with the minister of justice, to order joint-stock companies and limited 
partnerships to include securities acquired after 1 September 1939 in their annual 
reports.53 
Changes in ownership were made according to special provisions regulating 
transfers of Jewish and enemy assets, or resulted from standard more or less forced 
business operations on the stock exchange or outside it. Overall, checks on securities 
deals were tightened. First of all, with regard to the financial market practices in 
Germany, the functioning of the Prague Stock and Merchandise Exchange was regu-
lated.54 Government Ordinance No. of 27 March 1941 reserved purchases and sales of 
shares to financial institutions holding a foreign currency permit or acting as inter-
mediaries and dealing outside them was forbidden.55 A decree of the ministry of fi-
nance issued in December of that year even stipulated that all transactions involving 
ordinary shares and mining company stocks listed on a German Reich stock exchange 
be concentrated in the Protectorate solely on the Prague Stock Exchange. However, 
subsequent decrees mitigated this measure somewhat in view of the interests of Ger-
man banking institutions.56 
In terms of the operations of joint-stock companies in the Bohemian Lands dur-
ing the occupation, provisions regulating “corporate headquarters” [sídlo] became 
a matter of great importance. The location of corporate headquarters decided in fact 
under which legal system (Protectorate or Reich German) companies would operate. 
As for joint-stock companies, which often had before the enforcement of the con-
stitutional changes subsidiaries, plants, agencies and the like, on both sides of the 
newly fixed border, the choice of corporate headquarters (and the ensuing transfer 
to the appropriate legal regime) offered itself as an effective instrument to facilitate 
the control over individual companies on the part of the state, and by extension, as 
an instrument for finalizing their Germanization. 
The issue of corporate headquarters was first addressed following the constitu-
tional changes in the autumn of 1938. A Czechoslovak Government Ordinance No. 266 
of 4 November 1938 imposed on trading companies the obligation to define their 
corporate headquarters solely as a place where the head office was or its main part. 
Granting of dispensations to joint-stock companies, partnerships limited by shares 
53 Vládní nařízení ze dne 9. 5. 1942 o hlášení některých cenných papírů, Sb. z. a n. Protek-
torátu Čechy a Morava 1942, pp. 858–860.
54 J. Novotný — J. Šouša, Instrument germanizace, pp. 78–81. 
55 At the same time it was stipulated that securities officially listed on the Prague Stock and 
Merchandise Exchange could not be traded outside at prices higher than that on the day 
when the deal was made (or the preceding day). Vládní nařízení č. 137 ze dne 27. 3. 1941 
o obchodu s cennými papíry, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1941, pp. 562–564.




and limited companies was subject to the consent of the ministry of industry and 
trade by agreement with other ministries.57 
After the establishment of the Protectorate, moves of corporate headquarters be-
tween the ceded borderlands and the interior of the Bohemian Lands were initially 
effected in the same way as move from one state to another. Moving corporate head-
quarters to the protectorate was like the establishment of a new company, and if cor-
porate headquarters were moved to the ceded borderlands, the company was formally 
dissolved. As time went by, however, these practices were considerably relaxed as we 
know from the fact that the authorities did not create any special bureaucratic obsta-
cles to transfers of corporate headquarters. At length, a significant change was brought 
about by Government Ordinance No. 199 of 6 June 1940, which even formally simplified 
the process of moving corporate headquarters between the Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia and other parts of the German Reich. Moves of corporate headquarters 
between the Protectorate and the Reich territory were now effected without formal dis-
solution and did not necessitate the state’s approval, which was ordinarily demanded 
for all alterations of joint-stock companies’ articles of association. A somewhat strange 
situation developed though it was not absurd from the perspective of the Nazi interests. 
While moving corporate headquarters between the Protectorate and the Reich territory 
was in fact reduced to a mere notification to the commercial register, moving corporate 
headquarters within the Protectorate territory was still subject to the established ad-
ministrative procedure, making it more of an administrative burden.58 
Although the reception of the German stock law did not take place in the Pro-
tectorate, minor modifications of the economic regulations indicate a gradual ap-
proximation to the principles underlaying the German law. A case in point is Gov-
ernment Ordinance No. 26 of 21 December 1939, which allowed the board of directors 
[představenstvo] (in case of a joint-stock company usually equivalent to the manage-
ment board [správní rada]), to resolve independently to modify the articles of asso-
ciation in line with the changes in the constitutional order, unless a competent statu-
tory body (in a joint-stock company, general meeting [valná hromada]) resolved them 
by the set deadline of two months.59 The ordinance was published in a wider context 
of Germanization measures helping to formally establish German in the Protector-
ate economic environment as the official language (e.g. favouring German when 
57 Vládní nařízení č.  266 ze dne 4.  11.  1938 o  sídle kupců (obchodníků), obchodních 
společností a výdělkových a hospodářských společenstvech (družstev), Sb. z. n. státu 
československého 1938, pp. 1101–1102.
58 Vládní nařízení č. 199 ze dne 6. 6. 1940 o přeložení sídla hospodářských podniků z území 
Protektorátu Čechy a Morava do jiných částí Velkoněmecké Říše nebo z těchto na území 
Protektorátu Čechy a Morava, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1940, p. 487. For fur-
ther interpretation see Jos. Rauftl, O překládání sídel akciových společností z území Pro-
tektorátu Čechy a Morava do jiných částí Velkoněmecké říše nebo z těchto na území Pro-
tektorátu Čechy a Morava, pp. 47–49. 
59 Vládní nařízení č.  26 z  dne 21.  12.  1939 o  úlevách při usnášení některých změn 
společenských, společenstevních a spolkových stanov a o názvech některých peněžních 




dealing with the authorities, obligation to include German particulars in company 
documents),60 though its importance can be interpreted simultaneously as interfer-
ence with the standard decision-making mechanisms of joint-stock companies. The 
general meeting, representing in the original Czechoslovak business law the highest 
body of a joint-stock company which wielded all the decision-making powers, was 
noticeably receding into the background. 
A similar effect was produced by Protectorate Government Ordinance No. 141 of 
22 April 1942, which followed the Reich example in the regulation of profit sharing 
and payments to partners in capital companies and introduced a tax on dividends. 
A room for manoeuvre was created in the context of setting the maximum limit for 
payments of dividends61 to allow companies to change the amount of their share capi-
tal by simplified procedure. Changes of the share capital and the consequent changes 
of the articles of association were reserved for companies’ managing organ (in joint-
stock companies the board of directors [představenstvo] or the management board 
[správní rada]). Only the chairman of the board, who also compiled the statement of 
accounts, was authorized to table changes in the share capital and the articles of asso-
ciation. If his proposal was backed by three quarters of the members of the board, it 
was passed without being presented to the general meeting. The ministry of economy 
and labour then issued a certificate.62 
60 Company names and articles of association included such reformulated particulars as do-
micile, currency symbol (K), nationality of the members of the board of directors and oth-
er corporate bodies. The First-Republic ‘nostrification’ clause, which required that a ma-
jority of the members of a board of directors have Czechoslovak nationality and domicile 
in the territory of Czechoslovakia was characteristically replaced. The clause was now ei-
ther omitted or reformulated as “Protectorate and Reich citizenship”, and “domicile in the 
Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia and in the territory of the German Reich”, which could 
facilitate, given the generalization of the co-option practice, a disproportionate number 
of Reich Germans in the statutory bodies. Government ordinance No. 268 of 30 April 1941 
imposed on firms the obligation to make entries in the companies register in German or 
at least in German. Another example is a change of the language used in joint-stock com-
panies’ securities that was to be made by 31 Dezember 1943. Printed in the two languag-
es, the position of the German text was specified either above the Czech text or to the 
left of it. Vládní nařízení č. 268 ze dne 30. 4. 1941 o jazykové úpravě zápisu firem do ob-
chodního nebo společenstevního rejstříku, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1941, 
pp. 1363–1364; Vládní nařízení č. 26 z dne 21. 12. 1939 o úlevách při usnášení některých 
změn společenských, společenstevních a  spolkových stanov a  o  názvech některých 
peněžních ústavů a zařízení, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1940, pp. 31–32; 
Stanislav Janďourek, Jazyková úprva cenných papírů akciových společností, České právo. 
Časopis Spolku notářů českomoravských 1942, XXIV., no. 2, pp. 9–10.
61 Jan Stoklasa, Podíl na zisku a dávka z dividend u kapitálových společností ve smyslu vlád. nař. 
č. 141/1942 Sb., Právní prakse 1941/1942, VI., no. 9–10, pp. 288–290. Vládní nařízení č. 141 
ze dne 22. 4. 1942 o rozdělování zisku v některých kapitálových společnostech a o změně 
jejich společenského kapitálu, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1942, pp. 780–788.
62 Jan Stoklasa, Úprava společenského kapitálu u kapitálových společností v smyslu vlád. naří-




Extant minutes of meetings also indicate that in joint-stock companies’ every-
day activities they delegated, and more frequently than before the war, the statutory 
powers of the collective body, the general meeting, to the board of directors/manage-
ment board. The undermining of the function of the general meeting, and hence the 
principle of democracy in joint-stock companies, went hand in hand with a limita-
tion of their transparency. Under an Ordinance of 31 August 1942, the minister of jus-
tice was authorized, with regard to conditions and in order to maintain public order, 
to restrict access, generally or in specific cases, to public books, registers or lists kept 
by courts.63 An Ordinance of 2 September 1942 empowered him, with similar justifica-
tion, to stipulate for individual companies or groups of companies derogations from 
statutory provisions and provisions of articles of association concerning the posting 
of the annual statement of accounts and making certain entries in the companies 
register. The minister of justice was authorized to grant concessions on compiling 
the annual statement of accounts and profit and loss account, and in specific cases 
reporting to creditors on companies’ capital assets, matters of the board of directors, 
or commercial books and documents.64
These trends came to a head with Ordinance No. 134 of 23 May 1944 restricting 
general meetings of joint-stock companies and limited partnerships, whose obliga-
tion to hold general meetings during the specific was period was temporarily sus-
pended.65 The measure was justified in the context of cost cutting during the period 
of total war; from the viewpoint of functioning of joint-stock companies it could have 
far-reaching consequences. Not holding a general meeting meant delegation of this 
body’s power to the board of directors/management board [představenstvo/správní 
rada], which approximated its function to the function of the bodies, as defined in 
the German stock law [Vorstand/Aufsichtsrat]. Refraining from general meetings 
meant an automatic extension of the term of office of the bodies elected by the gen-
eral meeting and helped to generalize the coopting practice where the board of direc-
tors (management board) was personally changed without the shareholders’ formal 
consent. The board of directors assumed the authority to carry resolutions without 
the participation of the general meeting on the annual accounts and sharing of the 
net profit.66 Holding of a general meeting was specifically required only for a change 
or establishment of a joint-stock company, changes of the articles of association, in-
creases and decreases of the share capital, dissolution or merger of a joint-stock com-
Řízení při úpravě společenského kapitálu některých kapiálových společností, České právo 
1942, XXIV., no. 6, pp. 37–38.
63 Vládní nařízení č. 315 ze dne 31.8.1942 o nahlížení soudních veřejných knih a rejstříků, 
Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1942, pp. 1617–1618.
64 Vládní nařízení č. 312 ze dne 2. 9. 1942 o osvobození od dodržení obchodněprávních před-
pisů, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1942, pp. 1609–1611.
65 Nařízení ministra spravedlnosti č. 134 ze dne 23. 5. 1944 o omezení valných hromad ak-
ciových společností a komanditních společností na akcie, Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy 





pany, its transformation into a limited company,67 change of insurer, and in matters 
concerning the opening balance [Eröffnungsbilanz]. 
* * *
Legal regulation of joint-stock companies in the Bohemian Lands during the Nazi oc-
cupation evolved on a touchline between the original Czechoslovak and the German 
stock law. This clash between two legal systems which were in essence distinctly dif-
ferent was significantly reflected in the functioning of joint-stock companies, their 
management and their decision-making mechanisms. While in the ceded border-
lands the local enterprises soon followed the German stock law regime, which meant 
an immediate reinforcement of the joint-stock company management, and concur-
rent harmonization of the interests of the state and the economic operator, the prin-
ciple of legal continuity was maintained in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. 
Maintenance of the Czechoslovak commercial law regime cannot be interpreted here 
merely in view of the formal autonomy of the Protectorate. The occupation power 
succeeded in effectively exploiting the existing legal framework in its favour, and in 
the case of stock trading the original Czechoslovak law even created more favourable 
conditions for the start of the Germanization process. An instrumental role in this 
was played by the definition of “corporate headquarters” of joint-stock companies, 
which became a transmission mechanism between the regime of the Protectorate 
and the German stock law. Moving of corporate headquarters between the Protec-
torate and the other Reich territory was greatly simplified and usual formalities de-
manded for moving corporate headquarters within the Protectorate territory were 
not required. Although in the Protectorate adherence to the German stock law did not 
happen, minor modifications of the economic regulations are convincing evidence of 
approximation to the German Reich model. The most noteworthy feature is the weak-
ening of the position of the collective body, the general meeting, and the strengthen-
ing of that of the board of directors/management board, which culminated in 1944 
with suspension of the obligation to hold a general meeting. It is worth noting that 
the outlined changes in the proportions of the joint-stock company bodies followed 
in a sense trends started before the war, and thus they should not be interpreted 
exclusively in the context of the Nazi policy and application of the Führerprinzip.
67 The transformation into a limited company [s. r. o.] was later forbidden. Nařízení ministra 
spravedlnosti č. 228 ze dne 7. 10. 1944 o opatřeních v oboru soukromého práva (První na-
řízení k provedení totálnho válečného nasazení v oboru soukromého práva v Protektorá-
tu Čechy a Morava), Sb. z. a n. Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1944, pp. 1083–1086.
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